Coolest Apps For Your Car

Apps For Car

DETROIT — Despite the recent frenzy of fear over the dangers of driving while distracted, automakers are increasingly bringing the Internet into vehicles, including a slew of new smartphone apps that make it easier for people to manage their lives while in their cars–or control their cars when they’re away from them.

“The automobile is no longer a communications dead zone that prohibits drivers from staying connected to friends and family,” said Anna Buettner, an analyst at iSuppli, a consulting firm that specializes in automotive electronics.

“With the expanding array of communications options, many drivers are willing to take the risk of an accident simply because they want to read or reply to a text message or check and update their preferred social media site,” Buettner wrote in a recent report. “Finding and implementing a way to safely integrate social networking and other apps in the car is more feasible than fighting the trend.”

 

 

That’s why companies including General Motors’ , OnStar, Ford Motor  and Mercedes-Benz are promoting new technologies that link drivers’ smartphones to their vehicles.

“The action is about allowing customers to access the existing apps that they know, love and are addicted to, such as Pandora,” says Ford spokesman Alan Hall. The personalized Internet radio service has more than 60 million users, and one-third of them use Pandora in the car, says Hall. That means that millions of drivers are either wearing their headphones or plugging in through an auxiliary jack. Either way, the driver needs to take his eyes of the road and hands off the steering wheel to pick up his smartphone and control the app.

With Ford’s new Sync Applink, available first on the new Ford Fiesta, you can use voice commands to control Pandora and other smartphone apps. You could give a command to start Pandora, for instance, and then request “Play station Coldplay radio” and it will play through the car’s audio system. Drivers can even say “Thumb Up” if they like the song, to personalize the experience. It works with Bluetooth-connected Android and BlackBerry phones, but needs a USB cable with the iPhone. Ford says it is the first carmaker to allow voice control of your smartphone while driving.

OnStar, GM’s safety and security system, can also link to your smartphone. You can use the phone to remotely start the engine and cool off the car on a hot day, or lock it as you’re boarding a plane. You can also use it to get an up-to-date health report on your vehicle, including key diagnostic information, like how much fuel you have, when you need to change the oil and what the current odometer reading is. Following Ford, OnStar is testing a voice communications app for Android mobile phones that enables drivers to send and receive text messages and Facebook updates using Bluetooth-connected phones.

For buyers of the plug-in Chevrolet Volt, there’s also a new mobile app that allows drivers to program the car’s charging schedule, check the battery charge and EV range or pre-condition the cabin. Ford will have a similar app for its upcoming Focus electric car.

Mercedes Benz’ mobile system, called mbrace, lets you send directions straight to your car, from your phone or laptop. There’s also a networking function called Drive2Friend, which enables customers to connect and navigate to contacts or “friends.” New features can be added easily because the system is built on a flexible architecture developed by Hughes Telematics. The latest version lets customers access Mercedes’ in-car concierge services even when they’re not in the car.

Automakers have their own reasons for wanting to connect your car to the Internet. “The value propositions for having car as a node on the network are tremendous,” explained Erik Goldman, president of Hughes Telematics, which is working with other carmakers in addition to Mercedes. “You can pull diagnostic data for manufacturers to improve engineering, address warranty issues and provide information to dealers.” A dealer who knows you’re in the final year of a lease, for example, could see that you’re about to exceed your contracted mileage limit and might call to help you avoid penalties by putting you in your next car, he said.

So far there is no killer app for the automobile. Just as with an iPhone, the value depends on what’s relevant to you. Some offer convenience–sending directions to a restaurant from your phone to your car’s navigation system, for instance–while others are as simple as helping you find a space at the mall the week before Christmas. BlackBerry Traffic, from QNX Software Systems Co., is a real-time traffic app that creates heat maps and can give drivers turn-by-turn advice to route them around traffic jams.

“Fifteen years ago this stuff didn’t work because the mobile data didn’t exist,” said Derek Kuhn, vice president of sales and marketing for QNX, which was purchased last year by BlackBerry maker Research in Motion. Last week at the Consumer Electronics Show in Las Vegas, QNX unveiled a new system for BMW that will read e-mails and text messages to drivers.

And that’s just the beginning. Soon you’ll be able to download apps that can track your teenager in the family car. Did she drive faster than 70 miles per hour? Did she drive outside parent-set boundaries?

The opportunities–and privacy concerns–are endless, but the auto industry’s challenge is keeping up with the rapidly changing electronics field so that in-car technology doesn’t become obsolete as soon as the car hits the market.

There’s an inherent mismatch between development time in the electronics industry and the auto industry. Electronics are updated every six months, but automakers lock down engineering specifications up to three years before the vehicle goes on sale. Add six or seven years in your driveway and you’re looking at a 10-year technology lifespan.

If Microsoft can update your laptop over the Web at any time, why can’t carmakers reprogram their vehicles over the air?

They can, and they will.

Don't Worry for Internet Speed is Slow

M.Mohamed Asik

There are many different reasons why your Internet may be running slow. The type of connection you have ultimately determines how fast or how slow your Internet is going to be. With DSL, cable, and even FiOS growing and dial-up dying at an exponential level, many are left to wonder why their Internet is still going so slow. The health of your computer can affect your Internet connection. Spyware and viruses can definitely cause problems, but your Internet connection speed can also be affected by add-on programs, the amount of memory the computer has, hard disk space and condition, and the programs that are running. Keeping up to date with your anti-virus and anti-spyware programs are a must these days. New malicious software is created and spread every hour of every day. As these viruses get more complex, luckily so do the anti-viruses. Putting your anti-virus on automatic updates is strongly recommended.

Something else you may want to try is another browser. Internet Explorer is not the only option even though many people think it is. There are a few other really great browsers out their that may give you a boost in browsing performance. Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome, and Opera are all great free alternatives to Internet Explorer.

If you’re using a wireless connection, you may be suffering from signal interference, which requires your computer to constantly resend messages to overcome the interference. Household appliances and even your neighbors’ wireless networks can interfere with your wireless connection. To avoid slow Internet connections due to signal interference, reposition your router for better performance and change your Wi-Fi channel number.

Internet speed ultimately depends on the service provider. Your ISP may change their network’s configuration, or suffer technical difficulties, that inadvertently cause your Internet connection to run slow. ISPs may also intentionally install filters or controls on the network that can lower your performance. Don’t hesitate to contact your service provider if you suspect they are responsible for a slow Internet connection.

Unfortunately, there are events and conditions that are outside your control. Even with a fast connection, external factors, such as busy websites or spreading computer viruses, can slow the entire web. Popular websites can become overwhelmed with users. For example, when a television commercial mentions a website, many people might try to visit the site at the same time. If the website isn’t prepared to handle the traffic, you might encounter delays.

During times of heavy computer virus outbreaks, the Internet can slow down. Many viruses spread by causing computers to send out hundreds or thousands of copies of the virus. This can slow the Internet by sheer volume. You can see what major outbreaks are currently happening by visiting your antivirus vendor’s website, or the Security at Home website.

Local Internet congestion can also result in slower-than-normal connection speeds. These slowdowns occur when many people try to connect to the Internet at the same time, and they occur most often at peak activity times, such as after-school hours when students get home and connect to the web. If you’re on a corporate network, general network and proxy server use can affect your Internet performance. Most network administrators monitor Internet use, and will try to keep people from doing things like downloading large files during peak hours. If you find that your Internet access is slow at times, you might discuss it with your network administrator.
Article Source: http://EzineArticles.com/6422831

How to Remove Malware From Your Site

Malware not only can infect your computer but your website itself, and it can happen to the best of us. If this happens to you and your website becomes infected with malware, then search engines like Google will flag it and warn anyone who finds and clicks on your site in its search engine of the malware issue before they access your site. In case you couldn’t guess, this absolutely KILLS your traffic and can even cause your ranking to drop.

This is why it’s absolutely imperative that you check on your site from time to time to ensure that you don’t have any malware on your site. This can pass to potential visitors to your site which is why Google and other search engines will do them the service of warning them ahead of time. It can cause other webmasters who have previously linked to you in the past to unlink from you, as well.

If you find that your site has fallen victim to it, here’s how to remove malware from your site.

First, do a full virus/malware scan of the computer which you use to interact with your website. It’s possible that a problem here can spread to the files which you upload to your site and contaminate your site in full from there. I specifically use a free program called Malwarebytes for this.

From there, go ahead and delete the files on your server in full. MySQL files are generally alright to keep intact because they are kept on a different server, but if you have a backup then by all means clear that, as well.

Next, change your FTP passwords for your site and update any files/scripts to the latest versions as hackers oftentimes go after webmasters who use outdated versions which are known for their exposed vulnerabilities.

Check the malware warning from Google itself to see which specific files may have been affected. Once you know that you can go ahead and reupload any files assuming the scanner didn’t find any problems on your files.

Finally, using Google’s webmaster tools you can file a “malware review request” to get Google to come in and do another sweep of your site to ensure that you are now malware free so that your site can go ahead and be unflagged and stop scaring off visitors.

For more information on this, check out Google’s Webmaster Central which has a section for learning how to recover from a malware infection.

Article Source: http://EzineArticles.com/6416367

How to Remove Spyware From My Computer!

Mohamed Asik

Spyware can be a huge pain to deal with on your computer. You’re browsing a long, reading your favorite comic or blog, or perhaps playing a game and you slowly notice your computer starting to lag. The likely cause is because of spyware or a virus. Spyware or adware can be many different things. Its usually a program that somehow finds its way to your computer and runs silently in the background.

The problem with this is two fold. First off its sending your information out to whoever originated the program. From credit card numbers to passwords to your email accounts. The second problem is that we all don’t own super computers. Am I right? Most of us bought our run of the mill computer from a big retail chain and its good for what we need. Well, as that spyware runs in the background its hogging up resources that your computer needs to run quickly. That’s when you notice it slowing down.

There are many ways to tackle the removal of spyware. Some are longer then others. Some spyware programs are very difficult to remove and should only be dealt with by computer professionals. But for the average spyware issue there are several things you can do. First start by clearing out your cookies on all your browsers. This includes Internet Explorer, Mozilla, and Chrome. These are the most popular. After you’ve cleared all of your cookies out, set it to clear your cookies after you log out. This will prevent malicious cookies from sitting on your computer.

Another very important step is to make sure your computer is up to date. Make sure you’ve run the update program for windows or apple and that everything is installed. Generally, this is best defense against spyware.

Install all updates and restart the computer. Now you should have everything updated and all cookies deleted.

Now lets take a look at your program list. Find the correct application on your computer (Usually add/remove programs) and take a look at that long list. Do you recognize any of the programs? If its something you didn’t put on there yourself, its generally a good idea to uninstall it. Look for items like “toolbars” or “search” programs. These generally are bundled in with free software you may have downloaded and usually act like spyware.

Hopefully some of these tips can help you remove spyware from your computer. Good luck!
Article Source: http://EzineArticles.com/6360613

Home Security-Motion Detector Alarms

Home security is a growing concern for millions of people. Even though the housing market is in the tank, the average value of a home these days is still $200,000. Not exactly chicken feed! It is still the largest investment most families will ever have. Yet more people have their cars alarmed than have their homes protected. Part of the reason for that is because of cost concerns.

And it is true that you can spend a ton of money on all kinds of home security systems and devices. Here’s a review of four of the best motion detector alarms that are meant to improve your home security and provide some level of home invasion prevention and home burglary prevention.

With one out of six homes annually the victim of home burglary, home burglary prevention and home invasion prevention are uppermost on the minds of homeowners not only to improve their home security but to protect their family and their personal possessions.

1. The HomeSafe home security system. It includes: one base unit with programmable keypad and 105 dB alarm siren; one window and door sensor that’s wireless with a range up to 300 feet; a wireless motion sensor with the range up to 25 feet; and one key chain remote that can be used to arm and disarm the unit and a panic button. If motion is detected when the unit is armed. It will call up to five preset phone numbers with a prerecorded message. The system can be used for invalid elderly people who live alone as a caretaker emergency notification system.

2. The Voice Alert System. This system includes a base unit and up to six wireless sensor transmitters that can transmit up to 1000 feet in open space and 300 feet through walls. Each area is protected by a sensor and each zone has its own prerecorded message to alert you when activity is in the area. The annunciator system not only protects areas but can activate up to four relays to operate equipment like outdoor floodlights. This system can be used for commercial applications as well.

3. The Laser Sensor Alarm includes a transmitter and receiver that transmits an invisible IR light between them that can extend to 60 feet long. When that beam is penetrated a loud alarm or pleasant chime sounds. The volume on the chime can be set to low, medium or high and is a perfect application for a retail store to announce customers.

4. The “Electronic Watchdog” is a wireless system that uses PIR technology. When somebody enters the protected area up to 20 feet away the sound of an angry barking dog starts. A remote control unit allows you to arm and disarm the watchdog. The barking dog alarm can also be used for commercial purposes to protect warehouses offices and fenced in areas.

These are four of the best motion detector alarms for your home security.

The Home Security Superstore is one of the oldest and largest independent distributors of high quality home security, surveillance, spy, self-defense, survival and safety products including MOTION DETECTION ALARMS. We carry a wide range of self-defense products including tasers, stun guns, pepper sprays and other non-lethal weapons that can save your life in the event of an attack.

Our vast network of product sourcing, both stateside and abroad, saves you and your family time and money and insures you the lowest possible prices available in the marketplace.

Please check out our new BLOG with a link on our homepage. It has valuable information designed to keep you and your family safe including the “Safety Tip Of The Week.”

Article Source: http://EzineArticles.com/6447096

Al Qaeda under New Leadership

Ayman al Zawahiri

Al Qaeda’s Leadership. Osama bin Laden died during a U.S. Special Forces raid in the Pakistani town of Abbottabad on 2 May. It is most probable that two weeks later the senior leaders of Al Qaeda decided  to  appoint Saif al Adel as the new interim leader (Emir) of the organization. Al Adel is the former chief of Al Qaeda’s military committee and spent the majority of the last decade in house arrest in Iran. However, his tenure as the interim leader was cut short by the 16 June announcement that another Egyptian—Ayman al Zawahiri, bin Laden’s former deputy and one of the most prominent spokespersons  of  the organization—was confirmed as Al Qaeda’s new Emir. He will attempt to rebuild the shattered organization and its morale with the preparation of spectacular terrorist attacks while simultaneously trying  to ensure its survival during intensified U.S. counterterrorist operations in South Asia.

Al Qaeda Central after bin Laden’s Death. Now led by al Zawahiri, the so-called “Al Qaeda cen- tral,” suffered further serious losses after bin Laden’s death: Ilyas Kashmiri, the Pakistani connection between Kashmiri fundamentalists and Al Qaeda was killed on 3 June, and Fazul Abdullah Moham- med, Al Qaeda’s representative for East Africa and the man behind one of the 1998 suicide bomb- ings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya or Tanzania, was shot dead by Somali soldiers five days later.

Those spectacular eliminations of Al Qaeda central’s leaders and its representatives seriously weaken  the  organization  and  limit  its  capacity  to  conduct  successful  terrorist  attacks  around the globe. Its strength, however, lies with its allied organizations from the Afghan-Pakistani border region and also Somalia, Chechnya and Indonesia, its Saudi Arabian-Yemeni, Iraqi and Northern African branches and independent terrorist cells functioning within the Muslim communities in Europe and the United States. It is hard to expect such organizations and structures to cease terrorist activity in the aftermath of bin Laden’s death. Some of them actually possess the potential to intensify their activities and may attempt avenging bin Laden, the icon and the leader of the global jihad.

Al Qaeda Central’s Allies. Al Qaeda’s allies from the Afghan-Pakistani border region, and espe- cially  the Pakistani Taliban who officially announced their desire to avenge bin Laden, constitute the  biggest  terrorist threat to international  security. In the last month, they conducted a series of spectacular attacks on Pakistani security forces, including a double suicide bombing of the head- quarters of the Frontier Constabulary in Shabqadar that killed 80 people and the commando style assault on the Mehran naval base in the vicinity of Karachi, Pakistan’s largest city. The assault team managed to wreak havoc within the perimeter of the base for about 16 hours, and the Pakistani army had  18 killed and 16 wounded trying to flush out the terrorists. Such attacks further destabilized Pakistan, a state which is now in the process of upgrading its nuclear arsenal and locked in a frozen conflict with India. Its cooperation, however, is vital if American efforts in the “global war on terror” are to succeed. In addition to this, the Pakistani Taliban, which operate from the Afghan-Pakistani border region, have a documented history of targeting the West and utilizing their paramilitary infra- structure to train Europe and U.S.-based members of Al Qaeda central-affiliated cells.

The  jihadist  organizations  allied  with  Al  Qaeda  central  from  the  North  Caucasus,  Indonesia and  Somalia constitute a much diminished threat to international security. Most of them suffered serious losses when Supyan Abdullayew and Abu Anas, prominent field commanders of the Cauca- sus Emirate, were both eliminated by Russia, and Umar Patek, one of the organizers of the 2002 Bali bombings, was arrested in Pakistan. However, the death of Fazul Abdullah Mohammed in Somalia failed to stop the Al Qaeda-aligned Somali Al Shabaab from executing a successful suicide attack against Abdishakur Sheikh Hassan, the Somali minister of interior, on 10 June.

Al  Qaeda  in  the  Middle  East.  Out  of  the  three  Al  Qaeda  branches,  the  Yemen  structure (Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) appears to be in the best condition and will attempt to use the country’s  difficult domestic situation to its advantage and create not only a logistical base for its terrorist activities in the Middle East but also in Europe and the U.S.

Al Qaeda in Iraq finds itself in a much worse condition, but it could stage a spectacular comeback if  the political process in this country continues to stall. According to Leon Panetta, director of the CIA, the organization still numbers more than a thousand members and might grow stronger as U.S. troops continue to withdraw from Iraq, which is expected to be completed in December.

The least dangerous of the Al Qaeda branch operates in Northern Africa (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb). Five years after its merger with Al Qaeda central, the organization that earlier functioned as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat failed to conduct one successful terrorist attack in Europe, though targeting this continent was allegedly its main priority. The organization  is riven with internal conflicts but it could use the Libyan civil war to its advantage and relocate to ungoverned spaces in this country.

Individual Terrorism. One of Al Qaeda central’s strongpoints is its ability to inspire and radicalize individual potential jihadists who could conduct terrorist attacks targeting the West. An example of such a plot is the case of Nidal Hassan from 2009 who shot 13 American soldiers dead on their base at Fort Hood, Texas. Al Qaeda central calls for more such attacks in the statements and videos it released after bin Laden’s death. Their task is to simultaneously incite and authorize acts of individual terrorism carried out in the name of the global jihad.

Despite the seriousness of the threat from terrorist lone wolves, these calls from Al Qaeda central also can be interpreted as a sign of weakness. It seems clear that the organization now almost solely relies on  its allies, branches and individual jihadists to conduct any spectacular terrorist attacks. Due to security precautions and intensified U.S. counterterrorist activities, it may not be in a position to recruit new members and, because of this, is forced to call for acts of individual jihad.

Conclusions. Al Qaeda central remains the biggest terrorist threat to international security. Most of  its  terrorist  acts,  however,  actually will  be  perpetrated  by  allied  organizations,  its  branches or Al  Qaeda-inspired individual jihadists. This might reduce the number of  spectacular terrorist attacks   and   plots  that  would  target  the  West.  Unfortunately,  this  might  signal  an  increase in the number of plots and attacks prepared by lone-wolf jihadists who often would be acting without Al Qaeda central’s knowledge or direct authorization. In such conditions, countries without a history of a terrorist problem, such as Poland, the co-host of the EURO 2012 football tournament, could find themselves among the targets.

China-Pakistan Relations

Pak and China

Abstract

The paper examines the evolution of what is now viewed as an ‘all-weather relationship’, the bilateral  linkages  between  China  and  Pakistan.  It  seeks  to  demonstrate  the  nature  of  this partnership that has withstood the  test of time and what is the impact on it of certain recent international developments like the death of Osama bin Laden, and the resultant strains between the United States (US) and Pakistan. It argues that these events have raised the implications of Sino-Pakistan relationship from a regional to a global level, with the likelihood that the matrix on which it will be played out will now be wider.

Introduction

An enduring feature of international relations in contemporary times has been the high level of bilateral connections between China and Pakistan. Initially, they were strange bedfellows; one a socialist state and the  other  Muslim-majority, one a Western ally and the other a significant member of the Eastern Bloc. Yet, driven by perceived mutual common interests they managed to achieve such close proximity that the relationship now appears to have become deep-rooted, multi-dimensional  and sustainable. President Hu Jintao has described it as ‘higher than the mountains and deeper than the seas’. Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani has matched the poetic parlance by describing China as ‘the most beloved of  all nations’. A recent Pew Survey of Pakistan’s public opinion showed that 84 per cent of those polled had a favourable view of China and 16 per cent of the US. That says it all! This rendered Pakistan the most pro-China country in the world. Unsurprisingly, both China and Pakistan describe their bilateral relationship as an ‘all- weather friendship’, in their political grammar, the highest in the pecking order of any type of bilateral linkages.

History of Evolution

In  1950,  Pakistan  became  the  first  Muslim  country  and  the  third  non-communist  state  to recognise the  People’s Republic of China. Throughout the 1950s, China’s relations with both India and Pakistan moved on an even keel and when Zhou en-Lai visited both countries in 1956, he tried his hands at balancing when he spoke with equal fervour of ‘Hindi-Chini bhai bhai’ and ‘Pak-Chin bhai bhai’. Though, when the relations with India soured by 1962 followed by the war, and ‘bhai  bhai’ became ‘bye-bye’, the relations with Pakistan, perhaps due to that very reason, grew and the borders were  quickly settled. The Pakistan International Airlines linked China to the outside world. Pakistan, technically a Western ally as a Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)  and  a  Southeast  Asia  Treaty  Organization  (SEATO)  member,  became  a  conduit connecting China with the US and facilitated, former US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger’s and, former US President, Richard Nixon’s visits to Beijing in the early 1970s.

During the 1980s, Pakistan helped both the US and China to supply arms to the Afghan guerrillas fighting the Soviet Union, to  whom Pakistan had never felt close, partly for its ties with India, its stated position on Kashmir and for a sense of perceived betrayal in some Pakistani quarters during the Tashkent Agreement in 1966 (that concluded the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War). In 1986, Beijing and Islamabad signed a Comprehensive Nuclear Cooperation Agreement and  it is widely believed that China’s support was critical in Pakistan achieving nuclear weapon capabilities. Finally, in 2007, China became Pakistan’s biggest arms supplier with no strings attached and their true ‘strategic partnership’ began.

Some Ruffled Feathers

Occasionally, along the way there have been some ruffled feathers. Pakistan was not always satisfied with the reasons why China never militarised the strong verbal support during the Indo- Pakistani wars of 1965 or 1971. This was particularly true, during the Kargil conflict in 1999, when China appeared to take a neutral position between India and Pakistan, and had asked the visiting Pakistani Foreign Minister, Sartaj Aziz, to ‘settle disputes peacefully through dialogue and negotiations’. Indeed in 1996, Chinese President Jiang Zemin did cause some  ripples of surprise in Pakistan, when he asked that India and Pakistan build a cooperative relationship and set  aside  the ‘difficult issues’. The reference to Kashmir was not specifically mentioned but widely understood. In fact, China had always been a bit uncomfortable on the continued stress on Kashmir by Pakistan. As a principle,  ‘self-determination’ could have adverse ramification for, say,  Tibet  and  nationalism  based  on  religion  was  unpalatable,  due to  ramifications  for the Chinese Muslims of Xinjiang. Also, on the part of China, there was some unhappiness over, the former Pakistan President, Pervez Musharraf’s leanings towards the US. Over time, Pakistan, it seems, began to understand the subtlety and compulsions driving China’s postures. Eventually, Musharraf also turned to China and was able to get Beijing to criticise certain US actions in Pakistan. When  there was some opposition to holding the Olympics in China in 2008, the Pakistanis showered flower petals  on the procession carrying the torch through the country. China continued its generous economic and military backing to Pakistan and, in turn, Pakistan supported China on all issues of importance to China. These  included  questions of China’s sovereignty over, say, Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang, and other sensitive issues  such  as human rights, just as China has lauded Pakistan’s ‘counterterrorism’ role in the face of some negative vibes from the US.

Current Bilateral Ties

Strategic

The father of the Pakistani nuclear bomb, Dr A.Q. Khan, was a great friend of China. Indeed, China has  always  been a source of support and inspiration to Pakistan’s nuclear programmes. When stringent export controls imposed by Western countries rendered procurement of uranium enrichment equipment difficult for Pakistan, the China National Nuclear Corporation reportedly provided 5,000 ring magnets, key components to  the bearings that facilitate the high-speed rotation of centrifuges. China also designed and supplied heavy water  for a Khushab reactor,

which aids production of plutonium, key for building smaller tactical theatre weapons. This is important for Pakistan to build a possible first strike war-fighting deterrent of miniature battle- field tactical weapons, to be mounted on the recently tested Hatf-IX missiles with only a 60 km range and with a radiation fallout restricted to the battlefield. It has been claimed that this has already been achieved. Of course, Pakistani scientists provided enormous intellectual backup in these endeavours. Today, Pakistan probably has the fastest growing nuclear armoury in the world – somewhere between 90 and 105 warheads, or 70 to 120 by another account – a source of satisfaction to Pakistanis and worry to many other nations.

China is the source that largely equips Pakistan’s military, a powerful element in Islamabad’s policymaking. For the Pakistani Army, apart from small arms purchases, a joint venture project produces the Al-Khalid MBT-2000 tanks. Since 2007, for the Pakistan Air Force (PAF), China has been producing the multirole fighter aircraft JF-17 Thunder Fierce Dragons, (known in China as FC-1 Xiaolong) of which Pakistan has probably already inducted 22, while testing eight more and eventually looking to procuring 150. The PAF already has a fleet of  Chinese aircrafts, including F-7 PGs and A 5s. When Gillani visited Beijing in May 2011, following the US incursion into Pakistan that led to the killing of Bin Laden, the fast delivery of 50 JF-17s to Pakistan was agreed upon. At the end of the visit the Pakistani Defence Minister announced that Islamabad was requesting  China  to build a naval base for Pakistan in Gwadar, where Tianjin Zhongbei Harbor Engineering is already working on a US$1.6 billion project. While a Chinese spokesman  has  denied  it,  it  is  significant  that  to  the  Pakistani  Minister  it  appeared  like  a cherished aspiration that he perhaps wanted fulfilled. Since 2009, China has also been supplying the Pakistan Navy with F-22 P frigates.

Economic and Trade

China is investing heavily in infrastructures within Pakistan. Apart from nuclear power projects, the Gwadar Port and the Karakoram Highway along the ancient silk route, which began in 1966, there  are  several  mega-projects  in  which  China  is  involved  –  particularly  in  the  sensitive province of Balochistan. Next to the port, the China Harbor Engineering Company is building an international airport. In the same region, China’s Great United Petroleum Holdings is developing a US$13 billion oil refinery. Though, the political turmoil in Pakistan and economic challenges have led to decrease in foreign direct investment, which in fiscal year (FY) 2010-11 shrank by 28 per cent to US$1.23 billion in the 10 months leading up to April 2011. The Asian Development Bank has predicted that the Pakistani economy will grow by a moderate 2.5 per cent in 2011 and 3.7 per cent in 2012. In the struggling economy of Pakistan the consumer prices are still high and the budget deficit is growing to 5.5 per cent of the gross domestic product above a 4.9 per cent target for FY2011-12. Wa Gang, China’s Minister for Science and Technology, has said, ‘should growth improve, so will investments’. In 2010,  bilateral trade grew 27.7 per cent over the previous year to US$8.67 billion, with China exporting US$6.94 billion, and importing US$1.73 billion. During the Gillani visit, there was talk of raising those figures to US$15 billion by 2015.

A soft power that China exerts is that there are 6,000 Pakistani students currently studying in China and additional visits are being organised in each other’s countries for young people. The cooperation between both civil and military officials has also been very strong. Indian authorities have noticed  this cooperation and have  raised  a  point about the People’s Liberation Army engineers operating in Gilgit-Baltistan.

Drivers of Foreign Trade

While China is definitely a nation that has ‘stood up’ (as Chairman Mao Zedong reportedly said) and is on the  ‘rise’, Beijing sees this as a non-threatening and a ‘peaceful development’ or heping jueji, an expression  attributed to the scholar Zheng Bijian. There are certain ‘original roots’ in China’s behaviour pattern, dating back to Mao’s three-fold classification of the world, which view the ‘first world’ as the source of all instability. It is well known that there are red- lines that China will not allow to be crossed, such as an attack on its territory. But do current economic  interests,  such  as  the  US$3  billion  investment  in  Aynak  mines  in  Afghanistan, constitute as ‘core’ of an interest as ‘territory’ does? This remains the key question. Deng Xiaoping’s sobering advice ‘Tao Guang Yang Hui’ remains valid. It is difficult to translate, but roughly states, not to ‘hide brightness, bide time and build capabilities’ as Western translators have suggested. Though, it could also mean to ‘keep a low profile, be modest and prudent, and seek neither hegemony nor confrontation’ as many Chinese scholars insist.

Still, an increasing assertiveness is palpable, made apparent by the current US$91.7 billion Chinese defence budget, the second largest in the world. The manufacturing of J-20 Stealth Jets and DongFeng 21 D aircraft carrier killing missiles added to its ambitious blue-water naval plans reflect a burgeoning capability that would logically  find an expression in policy. Empirical evidence shows the river of Chinese policy meanders, but does not  suddenly change course. While China will be anxious to be seen as a constructive player in the global scene, its growing economic and military strength will find fruition in endeavours to slowly place itself in a pivotal position  of  international  affairs.  While  detailing  China’s  potentials,  Stephen  Roch,  former Chairman of Morgan Stanley, has said, ‘This is not a time to bet against China.’

For Pakistan there are constants and variables that drive its external behaviour. Pakistan has always sought extra regional linkages to narrow its power gap with its larger neighbour, India. This is its constant. The variables are the partners it turns to, initially to Western alliances and later to China. The length of its  relationship with China, however, is rendering this into a constant. Pakistan’s perception of India as an existential threat left it with no time or patience for idealism  in  foreign  policy  such  as  hobnobbing  with   non-alignment  or  Panchshila.  H.S. Suhrawardy,  a  Prime  Minister  in  mid-1950s,  acidly  remarked  on  this  non-alignment  in  a mathematical metaphor, ‘zero plus zero equals zero’. Pakistan’s recent bitter experiences  with the West and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization may have brought to the fore another significant  potential  adversary from  the West.  Indeed,  there  are those  Pakistanis,  including fundamentalist Islamicists,  who may be beginning to feel India is the lesser adversary. The answer to this may also lie in turning to China, as the Gillani visit in May shows. A US$5.95 billion defence budget, as the current Pakistani one is, is clearly insufficient for these objectives. This also means China for Pakistan is not just a counterpoise to the regional preeminent power but also to other pre-eminent global actors. This implies the graduation of this  relationship to another level.

Conclusion

The relationship between Pakistan and China cannot just be measured in statistics. It is far greater than the sum of its parts. A practical test of how this relationship will impact on global politics will lie in the post-US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Pakistan will possibly want to see a government in Kabul that it is comfortable  with.  This may include elements of the Taliban. China will want its assets protected, and will appreciate a Pakistani role in this. Gillani, during a recent visit to Afghanistan, has reportedly already advised on the need for  Kabul, even under Karzai to be wise and connect with Beijing. While it is too sensitive to bring Russia into this

‘Great Game’ yet, President Asif Ali Zardari had visited Moscow before Gillani travelled to Beijing. This was for the second meeting of the quadrilateral discussions – comprising of Russia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and  Tajikistan  – on the Afghan issue, the first took place in the Tajik capital of Dushanbe in July 2010. So can  Pakistan also play the role of a conduit, at least in Afghanistan, between Beijing and Moscow as it once did  between Beijing and Washington?

With the Iranian Foreign Minister recently visiting China , can  Pakistan persuade Iran, a fellow Muslim country though with whom bilateral relations have blown hot and cold, into this set of understandings?

These  are  challenges  that  confront  the  diplomacy  of  both  Pakistan  and  China.  Next  year, Pakistan will sit in the United Nations Security Council, as India is sitting now and China is a permanent member. Obviously,  the  two friends will have a chance to coordinate their global policies, providing a wider matrix to play out their bilateral relations. It will be important to do so because Pakistan and China have now emerged as each other’s closest allies. They will also need to work through one perceptional difference. Pakistan is often in a hurry,  because of exigencies. For China, on the other hand, time is not of the essence. When asked about the impact on history of the French Revolution of 1789, Zhou en-Lai famously remarked, ‘It is too soon to tell!’

NMIZs Vs SEZs

Abstract

India’s   draft   national   manufacturing   policy   proposes   National   Manufacturing   and Investment   Zones  (NMIZs)  as  instruments  for  revitalising  manufacturing.  The  policy addresses major challenges for Indian manufacturing such as inflexible labour laws, multiple procedures and environment-friendly production.  However, NMIZs pose several questions with respect to their relationship with Special Economic Zones  (SEZs). Unless states are consulted actively, the paper argues, NMIZs might be as controversial as SEZs.

Introduction

The High Level Committee on manufacturing, chaired by PM Dr Manmohan Singh, recently gave its in-principle approval to the draft national manufacturing policy. Prepared by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP), the policy aims to raise the share of manufacturing in India’s gross domestic product to 25 per cent by the year 2025, from what is 16 per cent at present. Ministerial consultations on the policy are expected to be completed  within a month, following which it will be reviewed by the Cabinet and announced formally.

The change and dwells at length on how production in NMIZs will be encouraged to be ‘green’. Considerable attention has also been devoted to inflexible provisions in India’s different labour laws and the options available to manufacturers in NMIZs for overcoming these inflexibilities. The policy  also highlight of the policy is its emphasis on NMIZs as principle instruments for enhancing manufacturing output and exports. The policy takes note of  India’s  imperatives  in  tackling  climate  addresses  two  critical  constraints  of  Indian manufacturing – shortage of skilled labour and complying with multiple procedures –  and offers various suggestions for overcoming the constraints.

What are NMIZs?

A discussion paper prepared by the DIPP, which is the basis of the new manufacturing policy, explains NMIZs.3  These are proposed to be dedicated areas devoted to manufacturing and will not only include industries producing manufactured items but also public utilities, logistics, residential complexes, environmental safeguards and other administrative services. Like SEZs, NMIZs will have distinct ‘processing’ and ‘non-processing’ segments; the former will house core production facilities backed by logistics and production-related infrastructure, while  the  latter  will  comprise  of  the  institutional  infrastructure  such  as  residential, commercial and social facilities.

The  policy  expects  the  Central  Government  and  state  governments  to  meaningfully coordinate the development of NMIZs. The main responsibility of the Central Government, other than approving  establishment of the zones, would be to connect them with external physical infrastructure facilities such as rail, road, seaports, airports and telecommunications. This   will   be   done   through   appropriate   public-private-partnerships   (PPPs),   wherever necessary. State governments, on the other hand, will be  responsible for identifying and acquiring land, and ensuring supply of electricity, water, sewerage, state road connectivity, health facilities and safety measures. The governing authorities for NMIZs will be in the form of  special   purpose   vehicles   (SPVs)4      with  participations   from   developers,   industry associations  and  the  major  manufacturers  in  zones.  The  SPVs  will  be  responsible  for preparing master plans for the zones, specification of land use, demarcation of processing and non-processing segments,  identifying industries that can emerge in the zones, approving establishment  of  units within  zones,  planning and  developing internal  infrastructure  and determining  user  charges  for  various  facilities.  The  SPVs  will  also  be  responsible  for choosing the developers for the zones and those developers can be either government, private agencies or PPPs.

‘Green’ Production, Labour Laws, Skills and Procedures

‘Green’ production is heavily emphasised in NMIZs with such production encouraged by specific fiscal incentives. Those fiscal incentives include cheap loans for investing in projects with  green  technologies,   creating  earmarked  funds  for  supporting  research  on  green manufacturing and investment subsidies for independent power plants in NMIZs using green technology.  In  addition  to  incentivising  green  manufacturing,  the  policy  also  contains suggestions for making labour absorption and retention in NMIZs  a more flexible process. Several   exemptions   for   NMIZ   industries   have   been   proposed   under   the   Industrial Employment  (Standing  Orders)  Act  of  1946,  the  Industrial  Disputes  Act  of  1947,  the Employees State Insurance Act of 1948, the Factories Act of 1948 and the Payment of Gratuity Act of 1972. NMIZ enterprises have been proposed permanent ‘public utility’ status so that they are unaffected by production disruptions from unexpected strikes and lockouts. Subject to specific conditions, the Trade Union Act of 1956 and other laws relating to trade unions will be inapplicable to NMIZs.

The policy has tried to address the Indian manufacturers’ demand for uninterrupted supply of skilled labour, by recommending establishment of training centres in NMIZs through PPPs with training curricula addressing specific needs of industries located in the zones. Training will focus on building three skill pools;  an abundant pool of minimally trained workers, a sizeable body of well-trained personnel and a select group of highly specialised employees. In  an  attempt  to  reduce  the  significant  transactions  cost  involved  in  obtaining  multiple clearances and complying with various procedures, producers in NMIZs are proposed  to benefit from ‘single-window’ clearance systems for both the Central Government and state government clearances.

Unresolved Questions

The new  manufacturing  policy  attempts  to  address  some  major  challenges  confronting industrial  production in India. Over the years, these challenges – inflexible labour laws, multiple  procedures,  shortage  of  skilled  labour  and  energy-inefficient  carbon-intensive production – have assumed chronic proportions, casting serious doubts over manufacturing’s ability to increase output in a cost-efficient and sustainable fashion. The proposed NMIZs are expected to do exactly this by providing manufacturers  enabling  environments comprising quality infrastructure, effective logistics and incentivising green production.

While objectives behind proposing NMIZs are laudable, they raise a few questions. First and foremost,  with  NMIZs  coming up,  what  happens  to  SEZs?  Five  years  ago,  SEZs  were launched with almost identical objectives. Now, 133 SEZs are functioning in India, including several manufacturing zones. 5  Many of these are focused on manufacturing. The question is will introduction of NMIZs lead to lesser roles of SEZs in India’s industrial strategy?

The DIPP paper suggests NMIZs can include one or more SEZs. This ‘inclusive’ nature of NMIZs can create complications. For example, given a choice, where would industries prefer to be located – SEZs or NMIZs? Incentives are likely to influence the choice. By locating in SEZs, industries not only enjoy duty-free imports but are also exempt from paying income tax, central sales tax, service tax and other state taxes. ‘Single-window’ clearance facilities are also available to SEZs. In contrast, general incentives for NMIZ industries, such as tax exemption   on   expenditure   incurred   in   obtaining   international   certification   like   the International Organization for Standards’ ISO 9000, or subsiding expenditure on filing of patents, while useful, might fall well short of the fiscal largesse available to SEZ enterprises. This might create difficulties in incentivising industries to move to NMIZs, unless they are in SEZs within NMIZs.

A particular incentive proposed for NMIZ producers, distinct from SEZ industries, is the assurance  of   purchase  preference  in  government  procurements.  While  this  could  be encouraging for producers and  draw industries to the zones, it might, in the long run, be incompatible with procurement rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). WTO rules do not encourage discriminatory treatment for specific enterprises in government procurement.

Availability of land and issues surrounding its acquisition will remain in full public glare as NMIZs  take  shape.  If  NMIZs  include  SEZs  –  along  with  additional  logistics,  support services, and processing and non-processing segments – they can hardly be small in size. As in case of the bigger SEZs, land can be a critical factor in curbing expansion of NMIZs. Other than a handful states and private developers with large land banks, obtaining land for large NMIZs will be a daunting task for both government and private agencies. More so, given that the policy expects states to bear the initial funding of land through either low-cost loans from international agencies or by raising resources from the market through long-term tax free bonds with land as the security. Poor maintenance of land records for establishing title rights to property and India’s relatively underdeveloped bond market make land a rather risky asset for issuing bonds against.

The SEZ experience underscores the importance of consulting states before implementing an industrial policy that depends heavily on active participation of states. India’s SEZs could have avoided much of the controversies they generated had the consultations between the Centre and states been deeper and wider. Success of NMIZs will depend upon how far the states have been consulted on the  policy and to what extent they are keen on pursuing it. Hopefully the ongoing consultations on the policy  will involve states as well. Otherwise, NMIZs might become as despised as SEZs and can be assumed by most as ‘land grab’ efforts by greedy real estate developers, as opposed to being virtuous vehicles for industrial growth.

Ethnic Federalism in Nepal

Nepal Emblem

The writing of the constitution, which has not been completed in the last three years, is expected to be drafted within the next three months – a feat that will strongly depend on the nature of negotiations and the extent to which the respective political parties are willing to compromise and reach a political consensus for the larger interest of the nation and its people. One key challenge that Nepal is encountering is the political incompetency to simultaneously address the various disputes. Both the promulgation of a new constitution, and the integration and rehabilitation of the People Liberation Army (also known as Maoist combatants) into the Nepal Army, continue be sore issues. Importantly, the inability to resolve the ethnic-based federalism, formation of governance and state-restructuring, issues have intensified the inter- party and intra-party political tensions.

The successful completion of the constitution impinges upon political consensus of state- restructuring and the modality of a federal structure. The criteria and process of redrawing the internal boundaries and delineating federal provinces require massive cadastral projects that in turn require political will, compromise and consensus. This task is inextricably tied to the rise of identity politics with ethnic groups clamouring for fair representation in order to avoid the negative impact arising out of the 1990 constitution. Highlighting the limitations of the 1990 Constitution, David Gellner argued that the Bahuns and Chhetris continued to dominate the higher echelons of the state despite the constitution enshrining the rights of individuals and banning discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, caste and gender.

During the period of the civil war, the Maoist insurgents galvanised minority ethnic groups and  mobilised  ethnic  grievances  to  garner  votes  during  the  2008  CA  elections.  The ethnicisation  of politics  is  bourgeoning  in  Nepal  and  it  appears to  shape the  inevitable outcome  of  a  political  structure  based  on  ethnic  federalism.  In  particular,  the  Madhesi struggle that gained momentum in 2007, has gained  significant political clout. Mahendra Lawoti argues that ‘if it had not been for the Madhesi movement, federalism would not have been incorporated in the interim constitution’.3  Ethnic groups such as the Madhesi, Tharus, Magars, and Tamangs share similar sentiments about their exclusion from various organs of the  state  and  the  ethnic  federalism  that  is  perceived  to  create  a  base  for  competitive democracy. As such, this concept harbours the hope of reducing the preponderance of high- caste Hindus. However, the fruition of this  is questionable since ethnicity, caste and class intersect in myriad ways thus undermining the possibility of  ethnic equality and inclusive governance.

Arguably, the primary issue is not just about the promulgation of the constitution but the political direction that Nepal is headed towards – in the context of carving out the country on the basis of ethnic federalism. The  ethnicisation of politics in Nepal has fuelled the inter- party and intra-party cleavages. In addition, the re-conceptualisation of provincial boundaries on the basis of ethnicity will undermine Prithivi Narayan Shah’s unification of the various states in 1769. In this regard, the political experiment with ethnic  federalism will firstly, debilitate the consolidatory efforts of Prithivi Narayan Shah and secondly, bring a  sharper focus to the ethnic differences among the various communities.

While  there  are  imminent  prospects  for  separatist  movements  to  gain  ground  if  ethnic federalism is not  asserted, there is also a serious need to analyse the feasibility of such a structure. Federalism requires mature leadership which Nepal lacks, and dividing the country along ethnic lines will fuel inter-ethnic hostility. As  an ethnically diverse country, a state structure based on ethnicity will, in principle, give credence to ethnic pluralism. However, it may not translate into inclusive governance and address all negative forms of exclusion. It is crucial  that  Nepal’s  political  leaders  garner  the  support  of  the  public  to  strengthen  the prospect of organising the country based on ethnic pluralism.

Furthermore, the communist ideology that captured the imagination of the public is at risk of being undermined, due to Nepal’s ethnic quandaries. The ‘People’s War’ was fought on the basis of an ideological  struggle to overthrow feudalism and the monarchy. The spirit of Maoism in Nepal evokes a sense of empowerment and resonates with the strong undercurrent of egalitarianism. During the inception of the communist movement, federalism was not on the political agenda for the UCPN-Maoist party. In fact, in 2007, when the parliament passed the interim constitution, ‘there was no mention of federalism although the  commitment to state restructuring  was  apparent’. 4  The centrality  of  the  UCPN-Maoists  leadership  will change based on their ability to tactfully adapt to the challenge of ethnic federalism, whilst retaining their communist ethos.

In the process of undergoing a political revamp, Nepal faces the threat of a counter-revolution. Since 2006, the  procrastinated transition for a ‘New Nepal’ has worn the patience of the people, which has far-reaching consequences in the long-run.  There is overwhelming hype over the delayed constitutional writing process. However, a more critical question that needs to be addressed is the challenge of ethnic federalism as a form of governance, in the light of Nepal’s fledgling roots in democracy. Amidst unending party politics, experimenting with a new political structure will sink Nepal into a deeper turmoil. Within the context of an upsurge in ethnic politics, it is integral for political actors to reconcile their various rightist and leftist ideologies and undertake a pragmatic approach in their state restructural process.

Kerala: Communist Survival – Now What?

Communist

The state of Kerala, which gave the world its first elected communist government in 1957, now provides one of the world’s last bastions for communist parties that voters support. Less than a year ago, observers predicted that  Kerala’s LDF government, led by the CPI(M), would be decisively defeated in state elections. That was the fate of the CPI(M) in West Bengal, thrown out of office after 34 years in power.

A remarkable comeback, inspired by an 88-year-old chief minister, brought the CPI(M)-led Front to within a whisker of retaining office in elections held in April 2011 but whose results were announced on 13 May. The LDF won 68 out of 140 seats, only four behind its Congress-led rival, the UDF.

True, the CPI(M) had lost 16 seats – down to 45 from 61 seats in 2006. True, also, that the UDF, led by the Congress Party, will form the next Kerala government. But with a majority of only four seats, the stability of the UDF government is uncertain. Only a reckless punter would bet on its completing a full five-year term.

The CPI(M), which controls a number of wealthy institutions, including a newspaper and a television channel, is well-placed not just to survive, but to be back in power inside five years. Far from being swept away, as many had predicted six months ago, the LDF won 45 per cent of the vote, only one per cent less than the UDF. It lost five seats by fewer than 500 votes.

Table 1: Kerala Assembly, Seats Won, 2011 and 2006 elections

Party	Seats 2011	Seats 2006
Left Democratic Front (LDF)
Communist Party of India (M)	45	61
Communist Party of India	13	17
RSP	2	3
Janata Dal (Secular)	4	5
National Congress Party	2	1
LDF-backed Independents	2	–
	68	87
United Democratic Front (UDF)
Indian National Congress	38	24
Muslim League Kerala State Committee	20	7
Kerala Congress (M)	9	7
RSP-B	1	–
KC-B	1	–
KC-J	1	–
Socialist Janata (Democratic) Party	2	–
Others	–	15
	72	53
	140	140

Source: The figures have been extracted from Mathrubhumi-Malayam Daily (14 May 2011).

The pre-election predictions were dire. The CPI(M) had been pulverised in Kerala’s local- government  elections in 2010 and in the national elections in 2009. Indications were that the same fate awaited the party in state elections.

The Congress Party has reason to be disappointed. It won only 38 seats and will need to be especially  solicitous  of  its  alliance  partners,  the  Muslim  League  (20  seats)  and  the  Kerala Congress (Mani), a Syrian Christian-based party strong in central Kerala and revolving around K.M. Mani (born 1933), which won nine seats. The Muslim League’s tally was the best in its 60- year history.

For 40 years, Kerala politics has been built around rival alliances, one anchored to the Congress Party and the  other  to the CPI(M). The two parties provide a relatively stable core with only occasional deserters. But minor parties scurry in and out of alliances as chance presents itself.

The new Assembly provides plenty of opportunity for scurrying. Five of the UDF’s 72 seats are held by ‘parties’  that in fact are individual enterprises and travel under names such as the Revolutionary Socialist Party (Bolshevik) [one seat] and Socialist Janata Dal [two seats].

The two top Congress leaders come from different religious backgrounds but the same social circumstances  and  locality.  The  new  chief  minister  will  be  Oommen  Chandy (born  1943), previously chief minister from 2004  to  2006. He is a Syrian Christian, the most aristocratic Christian tradition in India which traces its origins to the time of Christ and comprises about 10 per cent of Kerala’s people. Chandy received his higher education at Church Missionary Society (CMS) College, Kottayam, founded by the English CMS nearly 200 years ago.

Ramesh Chennithala (born 1956), president of the Kerala Provincial Congress Committee, is a Nair, the largest high-status caste in Kerala, perhaps as much as 15 per cent of the population. He is a product of Nair Service  Society (NSS) College, Changanacherry, the flagship educational institution of one of India’s most successful caste associations, the NSS founded in 1914. It is half an hour down the road from Chandy’s CMS College.

Achuthanandan, the remarkable 88-year-old, has a different but impeccable pedigree for a Kerala communist. He is an Ezhava by caste. In the old days, Ezhavas were held to be a low caste (but not the lowest), associated with the cultivation of the coconut palm that abounds in Kerala. They constitute perhaps 20 per cent of the population,  and their struggles  for civil rights in the twentieth century drew  many to  the Communist Party.  The unions  that formed  around  the coconut  industry,  particularly  the  manufacture  of  coir,  became  a  communist   backbone. Achuthanandan worked in coir production as a youth, joined the party and spent five years in jail in the  1940s and 1950s, when the Communists attempted unsuccessful revolts against Indian governments.

Today, partly as a result of its fiercely competitive two-alliance system, Kerala has the best social statistics of any state in India. It has high literacy rates, both for men and women, long life expectancy, low infant mortality and a low birth rate. Virtually every child goes to school.

But Kerala’s most profitable exports are its people. Kerala nurses work all over the world, and the Arab states of West Asia have been serviced by hundreds of thousands of Kerala workers for

40 years – the past two generations. In Kerala itself, the economy in the twenty-first century has grown at a  slightly  faster rate than India’s as a whole, but the state retains its reputation for sluggish growth and as a  tough  site for investors, tested by aggressive unions and litigious citizens. The state’s worthy social and  medical  systems are underpinned by remittances from Kerala people working overseas. There is little budget  room for infrastructure. The state of Kerala’s roads is abysmal, though a blitz on road repair early in 2011 may have helped bolster the government’s reputation sufficiently to keep it close in the recent elections.

Two vital questions arise from these elections. How will the result affect Kerala’s (1) economy;

and (2) social cohesion?

It is difficult to see the new government making economic breakthroughs. Though Kerala’s education  system  creates  a  highly  literate  population,  higher  and  technical  education  are undistinguished. Kerala is a long way from being seen as a knowledge hub like Bangalaru.

The UDF’s 44-page election manifesto is a long checklist aimed at ticking the dance programme of every group in the state. It contains few ideas, but plenty of undertakings such as:

1.  Procurement price of agricultural products will be raised proportionate to cost of production (p. 5);

2.  Public Sector Units will be strengthened (p. 11);

3.  Rules will be framed to entrust ownership right of Public Sector Units with the public (p. 11);

4.  Due to high density of population and scarcity of land, service sectors like tourism and information  technology offer better development prospects to Kerala than agriculture and industry. To achieve development in this sector, dearth of infrastructure needs to be solved expeditiously (p. 14);

5.  The pay and pension of State Government employees will be revised ensuring Central parity (p. 36)

6.  A free medical scheme will be introduced to the State Pensioners and their dependents (p.36).

It concludes that ‘the most suited industry for Kerala is information technology (IT)’ (p. 13) and places much hope on being able to expand Kerala’s IT capacity. But there is little suggestion of breaking with the long-standing Kerala pattern of promising more government services, even if they are often under-funded and patchily delivered.

Kerala is socially complex. Muslims make up about 23 per cent of the population, concentrated in the north of the state. Malappuram is one of only about 20 districts in India where Muslims are a majority. The Muslim League won 12 of Malappuram’s 16 seats, and the UDF took 54 per cent of the votes cast, the highest score in any district.

Christians make up another 19 per cent of the population, and the other successful partner in the UDF is the Kerala Congress (Mani), a Christian-based aggregation that revolves around the wily K.M. Mani, a fixture in Kerala  politics, playing both sides against the middle, for 50 years. Mani’s Congress won nine seats; eight of his winners are Christians.

Castes and religion are explicit, understood and integrated into Kerala’s politics, and they have not led to  significant violence for more than 80 years. One has to go back to the Mapilla, or Malabar revolt, of 1921 to find such events.

In the past few years, there were allegations that the CPI(M) was flirting with radical Muslim organisations in  an  attempt to win favour with Muslim voters. If this were so, the idea was disastrous. The Muslim League has  never done better than in these elections, and the three biggest majorities all went to Muslim League  candidates.  The largest margin in the state was

44,500 votes in the district headquarters town of Malappuram.

Political affiliation has been more likely to lead to violence. Indeed, on the day the poll results were announced (13 May 2011), a CPI(M) worker in north Malabar was murdered and a local Congress leader taken into custody, allegedly as the killer.

Kerala  confronts  substantial  social  problems.  Because  it  is  highly  literate  and  effectively administered, it records data more reliably and publishes its problems for all to see. On the basis of such data, the state has the highest per capita alcohol consumption and second highest suicide rates in India. Alcohol production and consumption connect with powerful political interests in the liquor business; suicide appears to be linked to the large numbers of migrants and resulting dislocation of households and personal relationships.

The most significant result of the 2011 elections is the survival of the CPI(M). That is not a bad thing. In spite of  the puzzling devotion of intelligent people to graven images like Lenin and Stalin,  party members  often  display  a  rare  dedication,  honesty and  courage.  The  All-India

Democratic Women’s Association (AIDWA) is one of the bravest organisations in the country. In the Kerala  survival story of 2011, much appears to be owed to the old proletarian battler, Achuthanandan. Whether men  and  women half his age can construct a radical party for the twenty-first, and not the nineteenth, century is a question that Kerala’s future will answer.